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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff alleges a discriminatory discharge from 
employment caused by her inability to work for about two months 
while recuperating from surgery.  The district court concluded 
that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Americans 
With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.  We agree and 
will affirm. 
 The relevant facts are those alleged in the plaintiff's 
complaint.  On September 8, 1992, plaintiff was hired as a charge 
nurse at the Polk Center in Venango County, a residential 
institution for the mentally retarded operated by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.  On December 24, 1992, 
during working hours, plaintiff became disabled because of severe 
abdominal pain.  She was admitted to a hospital on the following 
day and underwent surgery on December 31, 1992.   
 On January 14, 1993, plaintiff requested that she be 
placed on unpaid sick leave until February 14, 1993, after which 
her physician reported that she could return to work.  Polk 
Center denied her request because she was still a probationary 
employee and, under the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement, was not eligible for extended sick leave.  Because she 
was unable to attend to her duties, the Center discharged 
plaintiff as of December 31, 1992.   
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 Plaintiff filed claims with the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission and the EEOC, asserting that Polk Center had 
discriminated against her because of the disability resulting 
from her surgery.  In due course, the EEOC issued a right to sue 
letter and plaintiff filed her complaint in the district court 
alleging that the defendant had violated the Americans With 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b), and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43,  
§§ 951-963. 
 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6), asserting that the complaint failed to state a 
claim.  Granting the defendant's motion, the district court 
dismissed the federal counts with prejudice and declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law cause of 
action.   
 The district court reasoned that the Disabilities and 
Rehabilitation Acts did not apply to the transitory disability 
that plaintiff had suffered, and that she was not "otherwise 
qualified" to work during the period in question.  As an 
alternative holding, the court concluded that plaintiff was 
discharged because of her probationary employee status and that 
the Disabilities and Rehabilitation Acts hence were not 
applicable.   
 In an appeal from an order dismissing a complaint for 
failure to state a claim, we accept as true the facts alleged in 
the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
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from them.  Our scope of review is plenary.  Unger v. National 
Residents Matching Program, 928 F.2d 1392, 1394 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Plaintiff did not seek to amend her complaint and does not 
request that relief on this appeal.  See id. at 1401.   
 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 
has been termed "the civil rights bill of the disabled." 
Americans Disabled For Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) v. 
Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).  The 
statutory language and the regulations adopted to implement the 
legislation have proved to be ambiguous and, as such, fruitful 
sources of litigation.  See Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. 
Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113, 1117 (3d Cir. 1987).   
 Partially because it recognized the problems caused by 
inconsistent interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act, and 
intending to broaden coverage, Congress in 1990 enacted the 
Disabilities Act.  We reviewed the tortuous path of this 
legislation in Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330-31 (3d Cir. 
1995), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Pennsylvania Secretary 
of Pub. Welfare v. Idell S., 63 U.S.L.W. 3861 (U.S. May 25, 1995) 
(No. 94-1946), and need not repeat that discussion here.  Further 
amplification may be found in the legislative history reported in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267-602, in S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Sess. 
(1989), and in a series of articles published in Volume 64, 
Number 2 of the Temple Law Review.   
 These sources provide a helpful background for 
appreciating the purpose of the legislation.  However, they do 
not discuss the precise issue presented by this case -- whether a 
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disabling, but transitory, physical or mental condition is within 
the ambit of the Disabilities and Rehabilitation Acts.   
 Congress made clear its intention that identical 
standards were to be applied to both Acts.  42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) 
provided that enforcement agencies were to develop procedures to 
ensure that complaints are resolved in the same manner so as to 
avoid duplication of effort and imposition of inconsistent or 
conflicting standards under the Disabilities and Rehabilitation 
Acts.  Whether suit is filed under the Rehabilitation Act or 
under the Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for 
determining liability are the same.  Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 
281 (4th Cir. 1995).   
 The legislative history demonstrates that the 
congressional committees drafting the Disabilities Act were 
conversant with regulations previously adopted to implement 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Indeed, in certain 
aspects the committee reports borrowed language from some of 
these regulations in explaining the meaning of the proposed 
Disabilities Act.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 485(II), 101st Cong., 
2d Sess. 50-52, 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
332-34, 337; Senate Report 116, supra at 21, 22.  Consequently, 
the regulations so utilized have more than usual force in 
providing guidance for interpretation of the Act.  The 
Committee's use of those regulations as they applied to the 
Rehabilitation Act in a sense assimilated them as a means of 
understanding the Disabilities Act.  
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 The Rehabilitation Act provides that anyone receiving 
federal funds may not discriminate against an "otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability."  29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The 
Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination in employment "against 
a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
disability . . . ."  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).   
 The two statutes have closely parallel definitions of 
disability.  The Rehabilitation Act terms an individual with a 
disability as one who "has a physical or mental impairment which 
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life 
activities."  29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).  Under the Disabilities Act, 
a disability is "a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual."  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) includes "working" as a major 
life activity.  Section 1630.2(j)(2) lists several factors to be 
considered "in determining whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity," including:  
 "(i)  The nature and severity of the impairment; 
 
 (ii)  The duration or expected duration of the  
  impairment; and  
 
 (iii)  The permanent or long term impact, or the  
  expected permanent or long term impact of or  
  resulting from the impairment." 
 
 
 By way of illustration, the EEOC's "interpretative 
guidance" in the appendix to the regulation points out that a 
broken leg that takes eight weeks to heal is an impairment of 
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fairly brief duration.  "[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of 
short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, 
are usually not disabilities.  Such limitations may include . . . 
broken limbs, . . . appendicitis, and influenza."  29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630 app.     
 Similar regulations, promulgated pursuant to the 
Rehabilitation Act and in effect before the enactment of the 
Disabilities Act, may be found in 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j); 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 84 app. A; 34 C.F.R. § 104.3; 34 C.F.R. pt. 104 app. A.   
 The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources states that:  "Persons with minor, trivial impairments, 
such as a simple infected finger are not impaired in a major life 
activity."  Senate Report 116, supra at 23.  See also House 
Report 485(II), supra at 52.  
 In Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th 
Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislative 
history of the ADA demonstrates that Congress intended that the 
caselaw developed under the Rehabilitation Act be generally 
applicable to the term `disability' as used in the Disabilities 
Act.  See also Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 
538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 An example of that guidance is found in Evans v. City 
of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1988), where a worker 
discharged after excessive absenteeism attributable to a knee 
injury that required surgery was held not to be "disabled" within 
the terms of the Rehabilitation Act.  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the Act contemplates an impairment of a permanent 
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nature.  Id. at 853.  Similarly, the Court in Vande Zande, 44 
F.3d at 544, applying the Disabilities Act, commented: 
"Intermittent, episodic impairments are not disabilities, the 
standard example being a broken leg."  See also de la Torres v. 
Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1986); Stevens v. Stubbs, 
576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983).  
 Against this background of applicable law, it is clear 
that the plaintiff in the case before us cannot qualify for 
relief under the Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act.  As 
the complaint reveals, her inability to work caused by the 
surgery was of limited duration.  She entered the hospital on 
December 25, 1992, and would have been able to return to her 
duties at Polk on February 15, 1993, a period of less than two 
months.  Although she was incapacitated for these weeks, her 
inability to work was not permanent, nor for such an extended 
time as to be of the type contemplated by the statutes she cites. 
 To apply the Rehabilitation and Disabilities Acts to 
circumstances such as those presented here would be a massive 
expansion of the legislation and far beyond what Congress 
intended.  In the absence of statutory language, or even 
legislative history, indicating that the Acts are to cover an 
impairment of such limited duration, and not within the general 
concept of handicap, we cannot conclude that plaintiff was 
entitled to the benefits of the legislation.   
 As an alternative ground for dismissal, the district 
court decided that plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified." 
Plaintiff argues that "with accommodation" in the form of a leave 
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without pay, she would have been qualified.  However, because 
plaintiff was not "disabled" as that condition is contemplated by 
the Rehabilitation and Disabilities Acts, Polk was not required 
to provide accommodation.   
 This conclusion is consistent with the statute's 
language and case law.  The Rehabilitation Act bars 
discrimination against "otherwise qualified individuals," but 
does not define that phrase.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
provided guidance.  In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979), the Court said:  "An otherwise 
qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's 
requirements in spite of [her] handicap."  In another case, the 
Court noted:  "In the employment context, an otherwise qualified 
person is one who can perform `the essential functions' of the 
job in question."  School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 
480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987).   
 The Disabilities Act defines "a qualified individual 
with a disability" as a person "who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires."   
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).   
 Some cases have held that in certain situations an 
employer may be required to grant extended leave without pay to 
disabled employees.  See Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 
1990) (alcoholic federal employee); Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 
253 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 
F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989) (analogous state statute).  Rodgers and 
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Fuller were cases covered by regulations promulgated under 
section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act, which requires federal 
agencies to adopt affirmative action programs for the disabled. 
See Fuller, 916 F.2d at 561 & n.3.  Moreover, in Fuller, the 
Court assumed arguendo that the employee was otherwise qualified. 
Id. at 561 n.5.  See also House Report 485(II), supra at 63; 29 
C.F.R. pt. 32 app. A (Department of Labor suggestions: 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630 app. (EEOC "interpretive guidance").     
 On the other hand, several courts have held that an 
employee with a history of sporadic, unpredictable absences may 
not be "otherwise qualified."  Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 
Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 
525 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277 
(11th Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 657 (1994); Magel 
v. Federal Reserve Bank of Phila., 776 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Pa. 
1991), aff'd 5 F.3d 1490 (3d Cir. 1993); Santiago v. Temple 
Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 396 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
 In Myers, 50 F.3d at 283, a case involving a county 
employee, the Court pointed out that an employer is not required 
to wait for an indefinite period to determine if an accommodation 
is achieving its intended effect.  "[R]easonable accommodation is 
by its terms most logically construed as that which presently, or 
in the immediate future, enables the employee to perform the 
essential functions of the job in question."  Id. 
 Although some case law might support the plaintiff's 
position that an unpaid leave of absence is an appropriate 
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accommodation in some circumstances, it does not aid her here 
because she fails to meet the threshold test of disability.  The 
Rehabilitation Act and the Disabilities Act do not apply to the 
transient, nonpermanent condition that she experienced, and 
consequently, the notion of accommodation under the statutes does 
not come into play.  We, therefore, do not decide that issue.   
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed.  
